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Swnmary: Tlie paper considers whether International Commodity-Related Environmental Agree-
ments are consistent with the GATT system oftrade rules. A number of aspects are considered: use of 
import tariffs; applicability of waivers; trade sanctions against free riders; international standards on 
production process and methods; ecolabelling; preferential tariffs for commodities produced with 
environmentally preferable technologies; and the use of environmental subsidies. It is found that the 
two main variants of these commodity-specific environmental agreements are compatible with GATT 
rules. The issue oftrade sanctions against free riders of multilateral environmental agreements remains 
a greyzone on which the GATT system is still ambiguous, and where future clarification is required. 
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Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to investigate how International Commodity-Related Environmental 
Agreements could fit into the GATT system, and where sources of possible conflicts with the 
current GATT provisions could arise. In doing so, we are interested in the economie implications 
rather than in the juridical finesses. 
This report forms part of a wider project on the appropriateness and feasibility of International 
Commodity-Related Environmental Agreements (ICREAs) as instruments to accomplish internali-
sation of environmental externalities in the user price of primary export commodities. Since 
ICREAs are intergovernmental agreements which relate strongly to international trade and affect 
- or even contain - trade regulation, it is necessary to consider their consistency with the GATT 
framework. This issue could be important for two reasons. Firstly for ICREA members, because 
hierarchy may exist between their obligations due to participation in the GATT and their obliga-
tions in an ICREA. And secondly, because non-members of ICREAs could challenge certain impli-
cations of ICREAs which they consider to be incompatible with multilateral trade arrangements of 
the GATT. 
After a brief section on ICREAs, the background idea on which they are based, and on the way in 
which they may operate, ' we shall consider several latent friction points between ICREAs and a 
number of important elements of the GATT sysicm. 
The paper was written while the Uruguay Round was still continuing, so that alterations and 
amendments to earlier GATT rules were not yet dcfinitive. In order to look forward to the poten-
tial changes accomplished by a sucecssful Uruguay Round we used the draft agreement ('Dunkel 
text').2') 
International Commodity-Related Environmental Agreements 
Production of primary commodities in dcvcloping countries often causes or exacerbates degrada-
tion of the natural environment in the producing regions (Kox, Van der Tak & De Vries 1993). 
Sometimes commodity production causes irrcparable ecological damage, like exhaustion of unre-
newable natural resources. Prevention or ncutralisalion of such ecological damage requires meas-
ures which tend to increase unit production costs. According to the OECD's Polluter Pays Princi-
1) These issues have been treated more extensively elsewhere, for instance Kox & Linnemann (1993); Kox (1991). 
2) In the preparation of the paper very useful insights were derived from an interview held at GATT with mr. R. Eglin' 
(Director, Technical Barrière to Trade & Trade and Environment Division) on November 29th 1993. The interpretation 
and remaining errors in this paper are completely the responsibility of the author, of course. 
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ple, the producer must be made to pay for the negative externalities he inflicts on others. In com-
petitive markets a generic increase in production costs causes higher product prices, which are 
ultimately to be paid by the final consumers. Thus, in such markets the Polluter Pays Principle 
equates the User Pays Principle. From an environmental point of view two advantages are accom-
plished by this form of internalisation of environmental externalities in costs and prices. Squander-
ing of scarce natural resources by producers diminishes and consumers are confronted with the 
'real' costs of their consumption. It is obvious that some central authority is needed to make this 
system work. 
In world markets for primary commodities there is no single central authority which can impose 
internalisation of externalities. Export commodities are produced by producers which fall under the 
jurisdiction of sovereign national governments. The latter must be willing and able to impose envi-
ronmental policy upon their domestic producers. The economie situation, and especially the degree 
of socio-economic development, are major factors which affect domestic policy priorities in 
commodity-producing countries. In developing countries with low per capita income levels issues 
like food security problems, poverty abatcment, debt servicing problems and constructing an indus-
trial infrastructure, may have even higher priority ranking than environmental preservation. More-
over, LDC government apparatuses may not have developed the administrative ability to deal with 
the complexities of ecological monitoring and environmental policy implementation. They are often 
under pressure to secure enough forcign exchange earnings to finance their imports and service 
their debt obligations. The consequencc is that many developing country governments, though 
considering abatement of the negative environmental effects of primary commodity production as a 
valuable target in itself, regard this as too much of a luxury in their present economie situation. The 
capacity of individual LDCs to take care of the ccological degradation caused by the production of 
primary export commodities thus depends on: (1) their economie conditions, and (2) the adminis-
trative and technological abilities of their government apparatus. For this reason the 1992 UNCED 
summit in Rio de Janeiro called for financial and technological support of developed countries to 
enable LDC governments in implcmcniing environmental policies. There are good reasons to do 
so, since it is clear that various forms of environmental degradation in developing countries do not 
stop at national borders. Traditional distinctions between 'national' and 'transnational' environmen-
tal externalities get blurred when a longer time horizon is used. Due to cumulation, environmental 
degradation problems which are initially treatcd as 'local' or 'national' issues, may become transna-
tional or even global problems. A number of - initially local - environmental problems have already 
reached the status of becoming worldwide issues for scientific and political concern: the diminishing 
'green lung' capacity of tropical rain forests; perforation of the ozone layer; global warming; dwin-
dling of species; pollution of oceans. 
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Apart from the UNCED targets, another background idea of International Commodity-Related 
Environmental Agreements is that is must be possible to realise the 'Polluter Pays' and 'User Pays' 
principle for specific primary commodities which are traded in world markets. This represents a 
step from a 'development aid approach' in international environmental cooperation to a more 
market-based approach. To make this step it is necessary to remove a major obstacle that prevents 
internalisation with regard to primary commodities, namely the disincentive created by cut-throat 
competition in many international commodity markets. Because of the fierceness of international 
competition in commodity markets where many developing countries with similar foreign ex-
change needs operate, producers stick to ecologically unsustainable production methods for the 
simple reasons that these methods are commercially cheaper. Ecologically sustainable production 
of primary commodities often requires the use of other production methods and/or supplementary 
investments in protection of the natural environment in the production areas. An individual export-
ing country cannot recoup the costs associated to this 'technology switch' by simply raising its export 
supply price. The consequence would merely be that the country prices itself out of the market, and 
that other exporting countries will take over its market share. Importing countries can often easily 
switch from one import source to another, because primary commodities are rather homogeneous 
products. In commodity markets where less developed countries (LDC) are important exporters 
there is another reason for fierce competition. Many of them are highly dependent on a small 
number of primary export commodities for secure foreign exchange earnings which they need to 
maintain their import capacity and debt servicing capacity. This commodity dependence is the 
reason why, contrary to economics textbooks, these exporters react on falling world market prices 
by increasing rather than decreasing their export volume. Due to this market structure, individual 
export countries face a high price elasticity of demand. The same is often not true for total or world 
exports. The price elasticity of total import demand for LDC primary commodities is typically 
rather low, often in the range of - 0.10 to - 0.35, as many commodity market studies have found. 
Looking at this situation from an environmental economics perspective, commodity prices and costs 
for consumers are persistently too low. Foreign consumers in importing countries are implicitly 
subsidised at the expense of a welfare loss (depleted natural resources) in exporting countries. 
Given this difference between individual and total price elasticity of imports, there is an obvious 
opportunity for a co-operative, multilateral approach to realise internalisation of additional envi-
ronmental costs in the price and import costs of primary commodities. This is the aim of commodi-
ty-specific environmental agreements. 
International Commodity-Related Environmental Agreements or ICREAs pertain to the internali-
sation of ecological costs in the price of a specific primary commodity. Several variants of such 
3 
agreements can be used, depending on the nature of the commodity involved, prevailing production 
conditions, the structure of production costs, and the structure of the market. We here deal with 
three variants of which the GATT compatibility will be reviewed: 
A. A standard-setting ICREA (ICREA tvpe A\. This is an agreement between countries to use 
common standards with regard to production technologies. Such standards can be formulat-
ed positively or negatively. In a positive formulation the agreement defines the set of produc-
tion technologies and production methods that producers are entitled to use in the participating 
countries. In a negative formulation, the agreement defines the set of technologies and production 
methods which shall not be used in the production of the commodity. Positively formulated stand-
ards could form a disincentive to technological innovation. Therefore, a negative formulation is 
more likely. One could for instance agree to phase out certain types of production methods which 
are agreed upon as being ecologically destructive. ' If all important producers co-operate like in a 
cartel, 'average world-wide' production costs of the commodity will increase. Ultimately, world 
market prices adjust to these additional costs. Internalisation will be then be achieved in the 'aver-
age' country and those countries which are even more cost-effective in applying the production 
standards. 
B. An ICREA with Financial compensation mechanism (tvpe E). This agreement is a rather 
open and flexible instrument to promote internalisation of environmental costs. This flexibili-
ty may required when environmental effects of commodity production differs sharply be-
tween countries and types of producers, or when environmental priorities differ between govern-
ments. The agreement creates a compensation fund on which exporting countries may draw for 
financing projects and programmes to make the production of the commodity more environmental-
ly sound. The ICREA Fund is also important when a switch to more ecologically preferable produc-
tion techniques requires considerable pre-investment and pre-financing. 
The Fund can, inter alia, be fed by an import levy charged at border-crossing in importing countries, 
especially the developed OECD countries. ' Governments of exporting LDCs get drawing rights on 
the fund, according to an agreed distribution code. The agreement further includes broadly formu-
lated guidelines on the type of project and programmes which are eligible for funding or soft loans 
from the ICREA Fund. Governments of exporting countries submit the funding proposals. The 
1) While such an agreement would create an international ecological minimum Standard with regard to a specific commod-
ity, it would leave the freedom for individual governments to apply more strict standards in their own country. 
2) Other forms of financing can be used as well, like funds from ODA budgets or general government budgets (e.g. a part 
of value added tax on imported commödities), or contributions from multilateral funds like the GEF or a future Climate 
Fund. 
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Secretariat undertakes periodic monitoring to ensure effective use of the funds. Remittance of 
funds can be made conditional upon the effectiveness of use which has been made of prior fund 
transfers. 
C. A standard-setting ICREA with trade preferences ftvpe O. This type of agreement is similar 
to the first one (type A), but is supplemented with a positive incentive in the form of trade 
preferences for participating LDC exporters. In order to maintain discipline among export-
ers in a standard-setting ICREA, it will be very helpful if importing countries create positive incen-
tives for compliance to the goals of the agreement. To achieve this the agreement is extended with a 
system of environmental labelling. Environmental labelling means the use of labels in order to 
inform buyers that a labelled product is produced in a way that meets certain predetermined eco-
logical standards. If primary commodities with the ecolabel get preferential import tariff treatment, 
this creates a positive incentive to maintain discipline in the agreement. To guarantee the credibility 
of the ecolabel some monitoring and verification procedures need to be agreed upon on, e.g. in 
combination with a dispute settlement procedure. Because OECD import tariffs on raw materials 
tend to be very low, the exact form of trade preferences might comprise other commodities as well, 
including processed commodities. 
It is a common trait of all three types of ICREAs that they offer positive rather than negative sanc-
tions for participation by LDC exporters, and that they fully respect the sovereignty of governments 
in exporting countries with regard to environmental policy. Moreover, they offer the possibility to 
reconcile environmental targets with the exporting country's foreign exchange and budget con-
straints. ICREAs are environmental agreements rather than old-style commodity agreements, 
which aimed at commodity price stabilisation. At the same time, they must be distinguished from 
other multilateral environmental agreements because of their commodity-specific character. 
Let us now investigate whether, or to which extent, International Commodity-Related Environmen-
tal Agreements are compatible with the GATT system of trade rules. The following aspects will be 
considered: (a) use of import tariffs to finance the ICREA Fund; (b) applicability of GATT waiv-
ers; (c) trade sanctions against free riders; (d) international standards on production process and 
methods; (c) ecolabelling for primary commodities; (e) preferential tariffs for commodities pro-
duced with environmentally preferable technologies; and (f) the Subsidies Code and environmental 
subsidies. 
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Use of import levies for financing purposes 
A main objective of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was and is the liberalisation of 
international trade by reciprocal limitation of import tariffs and other trade barriers. Such recipro-
cal concessions were achieved by multilateral negotiation rounds, involving many commodities and 
therefore package deal negotiations. With regard to import tariffs it resulted in maximum tariff 
levels ('bindings') per trade item, listed in a multi-volume annex to the text of the General Agree-
ment. Contracting parties of the GATT are treaty obligated to keep their tariffs levels below this 
binding. If they grant tariff preferences below this binding, then normally such preferences are 
made available to all other GATT contracting parties via the 'most-favoured nation' (MFN) princi-
ple of the General Agreement. After several negotiation rounds the overall tariff levels on most 
unprocessed primary commodities have been reduced to zero or slightly above zero, while proc-
essed commodities still face substantial tariff escalation. Table 1 shows MFN tariff levels on select-
ed unprocessed commodities since the Tokyo Round which ended in 1979. 
Table 1: MFN tariff & on tropical products in selected countries, 1984 
(Per cent ad valorem) 
Product EEC Japan USA 
Coffee (raw, unroasted) 6.5 0.0 0.0 
Tea (in bulk) 0.0 10.2 0.0 
Cocoa (beans) 3.0 0.0 0.0 
0 ilseeds (unprocessed) 0.3 0.9 0.2 
Tobacco (unmanufactured) 30.0 b) 0.0 15.9 
Natural rubber (unprocessed) 0.9 0.0 0.7 
Jute (raw) 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tropical wood (in the rough) 0.4 0.2 0.8 
Rice (unmilled) 12.0 0.0 4.3 
Tropical fruits (fresh.dried) 9.9 12.3 13.5 
Sisal, hennequen (raw) 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Notes: a) simple averages of MFN duty rates applied at the t a r i f f - l i n e level 
in 1984. b) Estimated. Source: Computed by UNCTAD from GATT Ta r i f f Study 1984 
computer f i l e s . UNCTAD, Problems of protectionism and s t ruc tu ra l adjustment, 
TD/B/1160/Add.1, Geneva 1988. 
In International Commodity-Related Environmental Agreements of 'type B' import levies can used 
to finance the ICREA Fund. At first sight one might object that introduction of such import tariffs 
contradicts the principles of the GATT, because it (re-)erects new trade barriers. This argument is 
incorrect. Firstly, these tariffs are not created as trade barriers to protect domestic industries or 
trade sectors. Certainly in the case of several tropical products, the import commodities do not even 
compete with domestic sectors. Secondly, the import tariffs result from an international agreement 
in which the potentially damaged export countries (or at least a large share of them) participate on 
a voluntary basis. Finally, because the funds collected in this way are channeled back to the export-
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ing countries to finance commodity-specific environmental projects. 
A remaining, more practical question is how the relevant tariff bindings can be 'unbound'. The 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade offers two possibilities for this: 'unbinding' as a tempo-
rary measure (articles XII, XIX) or as a permanent withdrawal of a concession (article XXVIII). 
The temporary option under article XII only applies in extreme situations where a country^ mone-
tary reserves shrink below safe limits. Article XIX forms the main temporary safeguard mechanism 
in the GATT system. It offers participating countries an escape clause to apply, on a temporary 
basis, tariff or non-tariff barriers that respond to imports which are deemed to harm the importing 
country's economy or domestic competing industries. In the case of an ICREA this situation does 
not occur. Moreover, the further conditions upon which applicability of article XIX depends, are 
such that this temporary escape clause deserves no further attention. ' More relevant in the case of 
an ICREA is article XXVIII which creates the possibility of changing a tariff binding on a perma-
nent basis. It allows contracting parties to withdraw their concessions at any time, provided they 
grant 'compensation' and 'renegotiation rights' to other contracting parties. ' A guiding principle in 
the renegotiations can be that importing countries offer compensation for the (small) effect that 
tariffs will have on import volumes due to price elasticity of demand. To offset this demand effect 
exporting countries can be granted tariff concessions on, for instance, processed or manufactured 
commodities. Most commodity-exporting countries would very much welcome such a step. The 
costs of such tariff compensations for the granting countries can remain modest. 
The conclusion is that tariffs as part of a 'transfer type' ICREA can be compatible with GATT rules 
when the tariff redescheduling option of article XXVIII is used. The renegotiation process may take 
some time, but it forms a real option. Of course, the tariff scheme should be implemented in a way 
that satisfies 'normal' GATT requirements (non-discrimination, national treatment, transparency 
and proportionality). 
1) First it must be shown that imports of a product are increasing either absolutely or relatively, and such increase must be 
a causal result of (a) 'unforeseen developments' and (b) GATT obligations. Second, it must also be shown that domestic 
producers of competitive products are seriously injured or threatened with serious injury, and that this injury or threat is 
caused by the increased imports. If both conditions apply, an importing nation is entitled to suspend the relevant GATT 
obligation in respect to such a product for the time necessary to prevent or remedy the injury, after consultation of the ex-
porting nations (GATT 1986: 36-37; Jackson 1992:154-165). 
2) Literally, the text of art. XXVIII.2 reads: "In such negotiations and agreement, which may include provision for com-
pensatory adjustment with respect to other products, the contracting partners concerned shall endeavour to maintain a 
general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not Iess favourable to trade than that provided for in 
this Agreement prior to such negotiations" (GATT 1986: 47). 
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Applicabüity of GATT waivers 
Article XX of the General Agreement mentions ten general exemptions or 'waivers' which allow 
member countries to take measures which deviate from the provisions in the rest of the 
agreement. ' Three of these waivers are potentially important with regard to ICREAs. 
Exemptions (b) and (g) formulate in fact the conditions under which domestic environmental policy 
measures are allowed, even if they affect international trade. They refer, respectively, to measures 
"necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health", and measures "relating to the conserva-
tion of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with re-
strictions on domestic production or consumption". There is increasing international support for the 
view that these exemptions constitute a relatively explicit basis for balancing environmental and 
trade interests, provided that these provisions are not interpreted in a way that circumscribes na-
tional discretion in setting environmental policies. ' Future revisions of article XX could, however, 
provide clarification with regard to this interpretation. 
An important remaining issue relates to the geographical scope of the exemptions. Though exemp-
tions XXb and XXg form in the first place a legal basis for trade-affecting national policies, they 
could as well serve as a legal basis for measures taken in the context of an international environ-
mental agreement. The location of the object of such environment-protecting measures is not speci-
fied (Reinstein 1992: 114). Such an interpretation certainly holds for XXb and perhaps also for XXg. 
This has direct importance for International Commodity-Related Environmental Agreements. They 
are intergovernmental agreements with no other objective than to "protect human, animal or plant 
life or health" and/or "exhaustible natural resources" in some of its member states. Therefore, it is 
hard to see any a priori reason why ICREAs should not qualify for one or both of these exceptions 
to the general GATT provisions. If this interpretation would appear to be correct, the use of import 
tariffs to finance the compensation fund does not even need the aforementioned use of time-
consuming tariff renegotiations under article XXVIII. 
The third waiver which could be relevant for ICREAs is the exemption mentioned ïaXXh. It opens 
the possibility that trade-related measures "undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any inter-
governmental commodity agreement" are exempted from the general GATT rules. To qualify for 
1) The headnote to the article formulates, however, that application of the waiver is subject to the conditions that the 
measures adopted under them, do not constitute a 'disguised restriction on international trade', or a means of 'arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail'. Trade disputes on environmental regu-
lations could, according to Reinstein (1992: 114) be brought to the Standards Code, which is not covered by the exception 
in Article XXb. 
2) Cf. Charnovitz (1991,1992); Repetto (1993: 7-10); Verbruggen (1992: 60); GATT (1993b). 
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this waiver the international commodity agreement itself must meet a certain Standard. The agree-
ment must: (a) conform to criteria which are submitted to the contracting parties of GATT, and 
which are not disapproved by them; or (b) itself be submitted to the contracting parties and not be 
disapproved by them; or (c) conform to the principles approved by an ECOSOC resolution in 1947. 
The latter criterion sterns from the interpretative note to article XXh. It originates from the history 
of the General Agreement, which was originally designed to become the International Trade 
Organisation (ITO). From the earliest proposals, the ITO Charter included a chapter (VI) permit-
ting international commodity agreements to use (some) quantitative restrictions, and allowing them 
(some) divergence from the non-discrimination principle. When the idea of an ITO was aborted 
and 'provisionaüy replaced by the General Agreement, the ECOSOC Resolution in 1947 neverthe-
less established a link to the ITO draft chapter on international commodity agreements, so that 
agreements which conformed the principles laid down in the latter chapter would be allowed a 
qualified exemption from the GATT rules (GATT 1993a). The waiver for commodity agreements 
has never been used up to now. No complaints on existing commodity agreements have ever been 
filed. Nor have any of the latter been submitted to the GATT parties for approval. 
Though environmental aspects were certainly not envisaged when this waiver was created, it could 
perhaps be activated for ICREAs. The International Commodity-Related Environmental Agree-
ments are agreements with some market regulatory elements. It is doubtful whether they would 
comply with all criteria set by the ECOSOC Resolution. ' It means that they must be submitted to 
the GATT parties or the future Multilateral Trade Organisation for approval. This is a time-
consuming procedure in which opposition from non-participants of the ICREA could block approv-
al. 
So, although this waiver of XXli relates more specifically to commodity-specific agreements than 
both the aforementioned waivers, its application is unprecedented and bound to rules which imply 
that it will only be a relevant option if there is broad country participance to the International 
Commodity-Related Environmental Agreement. 
1) The 'ECOSOC criteria' imply that the international commodity agreement had to: (1) be open initially to all members 
on equal terms; (2) provide for adequate participation whose interest was in the importation or consumption of a com-
modity; (3) accord fair treatment to (ITO) members who did not participate; and (4) provide full transparancy with regard 
to their negotiation and administration. Moreover, before being allowed to control commodity markets via price regula-
tion, production regulation, quantitative control of exports or imports, at least one of two (additional) preconditions 
should exist, related to the abatement of unemployment and the existence of large stock overhangs in markets where small 
producers accounted for a substantial portion of total output (GATT 1993a). 
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International standards on production processes and production methods 
An agreed-upon set of standards with regard to the production process of a commodity forms the 
main instrument to accomplish internalization in a 'type A' ICREA. No matter if the standards are 
formulated positively or negatively, they always relate to process and production methods (PPM in 
GATT language) rather than to the commodity product itself. Because they do not relate to inher-
ent qualities of the product itself, PPM standards for imported goods easily develop into attempts 
of a government to give its domestic environmental priorities an extraterritorial leverage. Technical 
standards and regulations for imported goods can form effective non-tariff barriers to trade. 
During the Tokyo Round of GATT an Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade - the 'Standards 
Code' - was negotiated in order to curb arbitrary use of technical barriers to trade (GATT 1979). 
The Standards Code was extended and amended under the Uruguay Round. In the draft agreement 
of 1991 environmental policy motives are explicitly mentioned as legitimate objectives, ' but their 
implementation in the form of technical regulations and PPM standards for imported goods is only 
allowed when these regulations and standards: 
(1) equally relate to 'like' domestic products and do not discriminate between import origins, 
(2) form no unnecessary obstacles to trade (proportionality), and 
(3) are based on broadly accepted and transparant international standards, like for instance ISO 
standards. 
The existence of an ICREA is not automatically a sufficiënt condition with regard to the third 
condition. If a non-member exporting country is confronted with PPM standards and considers 
them to be non-tariff barriers to trade, it can file a complaint under the GATT. It is difficult to teil 
in advance what the outcome of a dispute settlement panel would be. 
Problems with PPM standards are likely to be much smaller or even absent, when such standards 
are used by the exporting countries instead of the importing countries. It is part of the national 
sovereignty of exporting countries to apply what measures they deem necessary to preserve their 
environment, and to harmonise such measures as part on an intergovernmental agreement 
(ICREA). To ensure that importing countries cannot claim that PPM standards for export products 
1) cf. Article 2 of the draft agreement on 'preparation, adoption and application of technical regulations by central gov-
ernment bodies' (GATT Secreatariat 1991: G2-G3). 
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are trade-restrictive, ' the exporters should ensure that the standards do not discriminate between 
products for exports and products for the domestic market. A further factor to support such 
common standards by commodity-exporting countries would be to make them transparent, e.g. by 
notifying the regulations to the International Standard Organisation in Geneva. 
A conclusion here is that mandatory PPM standards with regard to primary commodities may be 
incompatible with GATT when they are imposed by importing countries, and the more so when 
competing domestic sectors are treated more favourably. A preferable and appropriate approach is 
that such standards are agreed and implemented by the exporting countries themselves. There will 
certainly be no conflict with GATT rules when the exporting countries ensure non-discrimination 
between domestic-oriented and export-oriented commodities, and when the ICREA standards are 
notified to ISO. 
Ecolabelling for primary commodities 
Environmental labelling or ecolabelling mcans the use of labels in order to inform consumers that a 
labelled product is environmentally more fricndly than other products in the same category. The 
criteria for awarding the ecolabel prcdominantly refer to life cycle analysis of the products and put 
strong emphasis on the way the product has been produced. ' Because of the latter ecolabels are 
related to PPM standards. An important diffcrence, however, is that ecolabels are voluntary rather 
than mandatory. They inform consumers that the product meets a few specific environmental crite-
ria and threshold levels. The background idca is that ecolabels render the product a higher status, 
that consumers will be willing to pay a higher pricc for the labelled products (niche market), and 
that general product standards in a market wil bc raised to include more environmental aspects. It 
is for the latter reason that devcloping countries worry that ecolabels may become non-tariffary 
barriers to trade, when their export product has to compete with domestic products in the import 
country. 
Most existing ecolabels refer to manufaclurcd products. By the end of 1993 more than four hundred 
environmental technical regulations with tradc impacts had been notified under the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade. They cover, intcr alia, domestic sales and use restrictions on hazardous 
1) The EC threatened to do so with regard to the Indoncsian export ban on unprocessed tropical timber. The Indonesian 
government mentioned forest conservation as one of its arguments for this measure. Japan did the same when the USA 
imposed restrictions on unprocessed log exports from its Pacific North Western forests as part of a strategy to reduce harvest-
ing rates to protect the habitat of a rare bird species (Northern spotted owl). In both cases the domestic timber industries 
were not or only in a positive sense influenced by the government measures. For a discussion of these measures, see for 
instance Arden-Clarke (1993). 
2) Cf. Jha and Zarrilli (1993); Jha, Vossenaar & Zarrilli (1993); OECD (1991b). 
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products, environmental packaging, marking and labelling requirements, and waste disposal regula-
tions. Only very few of them related to primary commodities. Nevertheless, efforts to apply ecola-
bels to primary commodities are increasing at present. They are being considered for sustainably 
produced tropical timber, ' cotton, coffee, jute and cocoa. It may be doubted whether ecolabelling 
schemes will ever cover considerable parts of international trade in primary commodities, because 
of inherent problems with regard to certification and verification. However, to the extent that 
ecolabelling contributes to a higher willingness-to-pay for commodities produced by environmental-
ly preferable technologies, such schemes could be actively promoted and strengthened in the con-
text of ICREAs. Especially in standard-setting ICREAs, the use of ecolabels may be a complemen-
tary element which could allow preferential treatment by commodity-importing countries. 
Under the current GATT, the current Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, and under the 
amendments envisaged in the 'Dunkel draft agreement', the use of ecolabelling schemes for import 
products is permitted if such schemes meet a number of criteria. These criteria are that the label-
ling scheme: ' 
equally applies to domestically produced and imported 'like' products; 
does not represent unnecessary obstaclcs to international trade; 
is presented in a transparent and accessible manner, inter alia by notifying the underlying 
standards to ISO in Geneva; 
is based on standards that take product ion conditions and production methods in other coun 
tries into account; 
with regard to the preparation and application of technical standards and conformity assess-
ment procedures, takes account of the special development, financial and trade needs of de 
veloping countries; 
is based on standards on which, during a pcriod of at least two months before their adoption, 
interested parties in foreign countries have been able to submit their comments; 
is, to the extent possible, based on international standards. 
A conclusion with regard to ecolabclling schcmcs, if they were to be incorporated into ICREAs, are 
very well compatible with current and fulurc GATT rules, provided that some requirements are 
met. GATT rules stress the importance of international above national ecolabelling standards, and 
International Commodity-Related Environmental Agreements would intrinsically contribute to the 
development of such standards for a specific commodity. 
1) With regard to timber such ideas are being developed by ITTO, the ASEAN timber exporters, and the German 'Projekt 
Tropenwald' initiated by the German forestry and timber industry (cf. Jha, Vossenaar & Zarrilli 1993: 7). 
2) Cf. Gatt Secretariat (1991: G1-G27) and Jha, Vossenaar & Zarrilli (1993:12-15). 
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Trade sanctions againstfree riders 
The effectiveness and coherence of international environmental agreements can be undermined 
when free ridership occurs on an important scale. Firstly because free riders artificially gain com-
petitiveness and market share, because the participating countries incur additional production costs, 
and secondly because the free riders receive environmental benefits without having paid for it. 
Several recent international environmental agreements, like CITES, Basel Convention and the 
Montreal Protocol, incorporate the use of trade sanctions against free riders (cf. Enders & Porges 
1992: 138-140). These agreements require parties to apply more restrictive trade provisions to non-
parties than to parties. Some 17 of the more than 150 multilateral environmental agreements con-
tain trade provisions of any kind (GATT 1992: 45-47). 
The issue of trade sanctions in multilateral environmental agreements has led to a lively debate in 
and outside the GATT. None of the signatories of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has 
so far officially complained on the trade sanctions incorporated in multilateral environmental 
agreements. Many observers expect that if a dispute settlement panel would now be convened on 
the issue, it would consider the measures at odds with the non-discrimination principle. Another 
line of thinking is that such trade sanctions are allowed under the general exemptions article (XX) 
of the General Agreement. Reinstein (1992) for instance stresses that the negotiators of the Mont-
real Protocol considered the trade sanctions in this protocol to be in accordance with the headnote 
of the exemptions article. The latter states that the application of the waiver should not present 
arbitrary and unjustified discrimination between countries 'where the same conditions prevail'. The 
CFC negotiators found that countries which 'free ride' on multinational agreements, do not comply 
to behavioral guidelines with broad international support, and thereby artificially gain international 
competitiveness and market share, cannot be considered countries 'where the same conditions 
prevail'. 
An important discussion element in the GATT Group on Environmental Measures and Interna-
tional Trade is that a country's government can have good reasons for not joining an international 
environmental agreement. This may be because of controversial scientific evidence, differences in 
national risk assessment, differences in the capability to adhere to certain environmental standards 
(cost aspect), and different absorption capacities of its environment. Therefore, persuasion and 
positive incentives for participation should precede the use of trade sanctions. 
If trade sanctions are to be used for the attainment of environmental objectives, certain rules and 
principles should apply, and these are listed in Agenda 21 of UNCED $ummit in Rio de Janeiro. 
The measures should respect the principle of non-discrimination, should be the least trade-restric-
tive possible, transparent, and give special consideration to the special conditions and developmen-
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tal requirements of developing countries as the latter move towards internationally-agreed envi-
ronmental objectives (e.g Zutshi 1993: 16). Some countries voice the opinion that a future revision 
of the exemptions article should explicitly include a separate clause on trade sanctions in multilat-
eral environmental agreements (cf. GATT 1993b). To achieve this a two-thirds majority of votes, 
and more than half the signatories must support this proposal (GATT 1992: 25-26). Such a proce-
dure will only succeed when most of the major countries endorse the waiver. Until this has hap-
pened and no official complaints have been deposited, the issue of trade sanctions in environmental 
agreements remains a grey zone. 
The issue of free ridership is also relevant with regard to ICREAs. It may arise due to non-compli-
ance by member countries, or due to non-participance of important commodity-exporting or 
commodity-importing countries. In the latter case international parallel markets come into exist-
ence. These have proved to be an undermining element for prior international commodity agree-
ments, like the International Coffee Agreement. The effectiveness of a 'transfer type' ICREA will 
be negatively affected when important commodity-importing countries refuse to share the financial 
burden of producing the commodities with environmentally preferable production methods. 
It seems wise from a GATT point of view to avoid trade sanctions against non-members or non-
complying members of an ICREA as far as possible. Positive incentives, persuasion and co-opera-
tive international solutions should be used to the extent possible to prevent free ridership and to 
stimulate participation. Participation and compliance by exporting countries in a transfer type 
ICREAs is stimulated by the positive incentive of financial compensation and/or technology trans-
fer. Participation of importing countries would be stimulated if a differentiated export supply price 
could be agreed and maintained, with non-member importers paying a higher price. Trade sanc-
tions should be the instrument of last resort and their design should meet a number of minimum 
criteria which are listed above. 
Preferential tariffs for commodities produced with environmentally preferable tech-
nologies 
A main element of 'type C ICREAs are preferential import tariffs for primary commodities which 
originate from ICREA member countries and which have been produced according to certain envi-
ronmentally preferable production methods. This can conflict with GATT rules for two main rea-
sons. Firstly, preferential tariff treatment forms a department from the MFN principle, and second-
ly, this preferential treatment is based on PPM standards rather than on product standards. The 
latter issue has already been dealt with in this paper and we elaborate on the first issue. 
14 
Using preferential tariff treatment for products which have been produced according to some speci-
fied PPM standards, is very likely to be in conflict with GATT rules. The 'most-favoured-nation' 
(MFN) principle is a main element of the GATT system of trade rules (e.g. Jackson 1992: 133-148). 
It is formulated in the very first article of the General Agreement. The MFN obligation calls for 
each contracting party to grant every other contracting party the most favourable treatment which 
it grants to any country with respect to imports and exports of products, that is that no ('most-
favoured') country should receive a preferential treatment. In practice, several exceptions from the 
MFN treatment have developed over the last decades. Under the aegis of UNCTAD a 'generalised 
system of trade preferences' for developing countries has developed. It had a redistribution back-
ground and allowed OECD countries to reduce tariff levels on developing country manufactured 
exports below their MFN rates. ' The Lomé Conventions of the EC granted also preferential tariff 
treatment to some fifty developing countries, which also departed from MFN principles of the 
GATT. The same holds for the Caribbean Basin Initiative of 1983, by which the USA granted 
preferences to a number of countries in the Caribbean basin. After 1983, the USA increasingly 
adopted an 'ad hoc' approach of granting or withdrawing the MFN status of its trading partners 
(e.g. in its relations with the EC, Mexico, Japan, China and the East-Asian NICs) in order to punish 
or reward certain regimes and policies. 
The conclusion is that in practice the MFN principle has been seriously eroded over the last two 
decades. It remains to be seen whether the MFN system will be restored as a result of the Uruguay 
Round. There is increasing doubt whether the preferential tariff treatment of developing countries 
achieved the original UNCTAD objectives of trade creation, and whether their exemption of apply-
ing the MFN principle to their own imports didn't do their economies more bad than good in terms 
of efficiency and access to world markets (e.g. Hudec 1987). 
ICREAs should be so designed that they cause the least conflict with current GATT rules.Preferen-
tial tariff treatment for primary commodities whose production methods satisfied certain PPM 
standards, in principle infringes on two important GATT principles (MFN, equal treatment to 'like' 
products). Therefore, this variant of International Commodity-Related Environmental Agreements 
is definitely less attractive from a GATT point of view. 
Even though the MFN principle has in practice been eroded on many occasions, there is no reason 
to create new anomalies if they can be avoided. The PPM problem could be avoided by applying 
these standards in the exporting countries rather than in the importing member countries of an 
1) The effect of these 'generalised' tariff concessions has been limited, because preferential imports were subject to quota, 
because many important goods (like textiles, clothing, processed agricultural products, leather) were excluded from the 
schemes, and because the preference scheme contained escape clauses which allowed the granting country to withdraw the 
concessions when they caused 'market disruption' (cf. Winters 1991:172-175; Jackson 1992: 275-282). 
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ICREA. Moreover, if possible, commodities produced according to the agreed PPM standards, 
could voluntarily qualify for an ecolabel, supported by the ICREA members, which would justify 
differential tariff treatment and/or price differentiation. Avoiding the MFN problem in 'type C' 
ICREAs is, however, much more difficult, and this forms a good reason for considering this ICREA 
variant as the least attractive option. 
The Subsidies Code and environmental subsidies 
The last element of the GATT rules that we will deal with, are the regulations on subsidies. Subsi-
dies, like tariffs, can cause price and trade distortions. This is the reason why the GATT from its 
inception paid attention to the use of subsidies in international trade. During the Tokyo Round 
(1979) further agreement was reached on this issue, which materialised in the 'Subsidies Code'. The 
code has been signed by most important OECD countries, but many developing GATT parties are 
not (yet) among its signatories. Crucial in the GATT approach towards subsidies is the distinction 
between general producer subsidies and export subsidies (Jackson 1992: 249-251). 
General producer subsidies are issue-oriented and are granted for the benefit of products re-
gardless of whether those products are exported or not. Here the principles of national treatment 
and national sovereignty apply. Such general producer subsidies cannot be challenged under the 
GATT. Nevertheless, they may affect international trade by directly or indirectly stimulating more 
exports or reducing imports. Therefore, governments are asked to notify these subsidies to other 
contracting parties of the GATT, describing extent and nature of the subsidy, its estimated effect on 
exports or imports, and the circumstances making subsidisation necessary. The Subsidies Code 
further specifies a code of conduct for member governments to minimise the negative trade conse-
quences of general producer subsidies on other countries. 
Export subsidies, contrary to general producer subsidies, are specifically granted to products 
when they are exported. They intentionally affect international trade conditions, and may cause 
harmful commercial effects in other countries. Such subsidies can be challenged under the GATT. 
Article XVIB specifically mentions that contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of export 
subsidies for primary commodities in a manner that results in having 'more than an equitable share 
of world export trade in that product' (GATT 1986: 27). 
The relevance of these provisions is that environmental subsidies for producers are perfectly 
compatible with the GATT, provided that they are applied as part as of an integrated national 
programme that does not discriminate between trade destinations, and that does not create unnec-
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essary commercial injury to other signatories. ' TUI now none of the GATT parties has ever chal-
lenged the legitimacy of another signatory's domestic environmental subsidy programme. In the 
'Dunkel draft treaty for the Uruguay Round it is explicitly stated that environmental subsidies in 
agriculture shall be exempt from the subsidy reduction commitments in the rest of the agreement, if 
such payments (including payments in kind): ' 
a) are "part of a clearly-defmed government environmental or conservation programme"; 
b) "be dependent on the fulfillment of specific conditions under the government programme, 
including conditions related to production methods and inputs"; and 
c) the amount of payment is "limited to the extra costs or loss of income involved in complying 
with the government programme". 
It must be very well possible to create domestic environmental programmes, funded (at least partly) 
by ICREA transfers, within the limits set by these GATT criteria. 
Conckision 
The existing GATT rules, provided that they are not interpreted in a way that unnecessarily curtails 
national discretion in designing environmental policies, offer ample opportunity for the formulation 
of national environmental policy measures. Nevertheless, it is for two reasons important that trade-
affecting environmental measures are testable and accountable in the light of internationals trade 
rules. Firstly, because it is important that 'green' arguments are used to cover up 'ordinary5 trade 
protectionism. And secondly, because, national measures may affect international trade in an 
unnecessarily restrictive way. A central message from the UNCED conference in Rio was that trade 
and environment policies should be mutually supportive. Agenda 21 explicitly stated that the 
accomplishment of "an open, equitable, secure, non-discriminatory and predictable multilateral 
trading system" would represent a large step in this direction. Behavioral rules for international 
trade, as specified in the General Agreement, have an important value of their own because they 
guide national trade procedures, offer possibilities for dispute settlement and contribute to preven-
tion of archaic trade wars. 
Thus, it is important to establish that the GATT rules do not in themselves form a stumbling block 
for adequate environmental policy formulation. In the case of environmental problems with an 
international (trade) dimension GATT has a clear preference for multilateral solutions and positive 
1) This latter condition is specified in the Subsidies Code, but its application is far from easy and still under debate. See 
for instance Jackson (1986: 259-273). 
2) Derived from Annex 2 ("Domestic support: the basis for exemption from the reduction commitments") to the concept 
"Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture" (Gatt Secretariat 1991: L.18). 
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incentives for participation in such multilateral solutions. R. Eglin (1992: 96) of the GATT ex-
pressed this in the following way: "The more international environmental problems can be resolved 
multilaterally, the less chance there is of the problems degenerating into a source of trade friction 
for GATT. And it would appear more appropriate for environmental agreements to be backed up 
by financial compensation agreements and technological transfers, where these are necessary to 
encourage full participation, rather than using trade weapons to force countries into courses of 
action that are not of their own choosing". We fully subscribe to this opinion, but having said that, it 
should be acknowledged that cases may arise in which national decisions of limited numbers of 
countries to 'free ride' on multilateral solutions to international environmental problems, may effec-
tively undermine such solutions. In such cases, and after offers of positive incentives for participa-
tion have failed, it will be difficult to avoid political sanctions and economie sanctions with regard to 
trade, fïnance and investment. Accentuation and elaboration of GATT rules for such situations will 
be necessary in future amendments of the General Agreement. 
The paper looked at the GATT-compatibility of three main variants of International Commodity-
Related Environmental Agreements. If was found that the standard-setting variant (type A) will be 
incompatible with existing trade rules when mandatory PPM standards are implemented by 
commodity-importing countries. Exporting countries are free to apply such standards in the context 
of an international agreement. If the standard-setting ICREA variant is extended with an ecolabel-
ling scheme, this must be applied on a voluntary basis and not unilaterally imposed by importing 
countries. If certain GATT requirements with regard to ecolabelling schemes are met, it could form 
a useful addition to standard-setting ICREAs. 
The transfer type variant (type B) of International Commodity-Related Environmental Agreements 
is consistent with GATT provisions. Using import tariffs for financing a compensation fund makes 
it necessary to apply the tariff rescheduling option incorporated in article XXVIII of the General 
Agreement. This could even be avoided when the general 'waivers' of articles XXb,g apply, and 
indeed, there are good reasons that ICREAs qualify for these waivers. The GATT waiver for inter-
national commodity agreements (article XXh) has never been used so far, and its application for 
ICREAs seems only possible when the latter agreements have a broad country participance. 
The preferential tariffs variant (type C) of ICREAs is the less preferable variant from a GATT point 
of view. Granting preferential trade access for commodities produced according to some agreed 
PPM standards is at odds with the most-favoured-nation' principle of the General 
Agreement. Moreover, the application of PPM standards by importing countries is likely to cause 
problems with the non-discrimination principle for 'like' products. 
As a general conclusion we can say that 'type A' and 'type B' ICREAs both can be designed 
in such a way that they are perfectly compatible with existing GATT rules. 
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